Tag Archives: economy

Dear President Obama:

The Wells Fargo Economics Group summarizes the state of the US economy in its Monthly Outlook, 7-8-2015:

Halfway through 2015, and now six years into recovery, the U.S. economy remains in strange territory. Real GDP growth has proceeded on a narrow path, averaging just a 2.2 percent pace. Even this modest pace, however, has been sufficient to pull the unemployment rate down to levels near most conventional measures of full employment. Despite the low unemployment rate, the economy and labor market are anything but a picture of health. In fact, the feeble gait of this expansion has kept the economy vulnerable to the slightest misstep, be that bad weather, labor strife, or foreign events.

Your administration stands for social justice.  You value taking care of the poor and disadvantaged above all else.  Greedy capitalism that created the financial collapse in 2008 has been met with stiff retribution, penalizing banks and other perpetrators.  Moreover, by your virtual executive fiat, we now have Obamacare.

Giddy liberals deride “trickle-down economics” as failed policy.  By metrics such as income equality, it most certainly was.  Policy may be corrupted by politics, and there are few effective checks and balances for executive compensation.

It is time for a reality check.  Can we afford to subsidize services and extract capital from banks (effectively penalizing innocent investors for someone else’s misdeed’s, and exacerbated by government policy encouraging home ownership), rather than encouraging investment and growth?  Is it unreasonable to focus on creating wealth first, so we have something to fund social programs?  Or should we handicap wealth generation to do good now?  Regardless of your answer, we shouldn’t be surprised by the economic situation summarized above based on policies of the past 6 years.

When the economy falters, the middle class suffers.

How to Prepare for the Next Crash

First let’s define “Crash”.  To most, the term implies a decline of severe magnitude. A key question is the duration of the impairment, or how long might it take to recover?  Another consideration is stock market valuation.

By my observation, there hasn’t been a stock market crash in the US in the last hundred years that began with stocks at historically reasonable valuations that persisted more than 5 years.  The risk of a crash depends on valuation.  The average PE ratio in 1929 was about 60 times earnings. Fifteen or sixteen is widely considered average, and implies a 6.25% to 6.67% earnings yield.  That’s reasonable.  Today, the PE for the S&P 500 is was 18.94 on 9/26/2014 according to the Wall Street Journal, and that’s a little above normal.  It implies expectations that the economy and growth will continue to accelerate from the anemic post mortgage crisis recovery.

So how do you prepare, just in case?  The conventional approach to hedging the stock market is to incorporate bonds to a portfolio.  You own bonds for either of two reasons; either you need income, or you want to reduce the volatility of a portfolio.  Currently the ability of bonds to generate income is diminished by Fed policy.  While bonds may still provide some stability in the event of a crash, it is widely recognized that interest rates are likely to rise and that will reduce the value of outstanding bonds with fixed coupons.  Choose your poison.

An alternative strategy is to focus on the likely duration of a downturn in the stock market, and plan for expected liquidity needs for that amount of time.  A key benefit of financial planning is that it identifies liquidity needs.  During a period of low interest rates, one can substitute a reserve strategy, often called the Bucket Approach, to provide for anticipated liquidity needs for as long as a crash/correction might be likely to persist.  This frees the remainder of the portfolio for management with a longer time horizon, and with focus of fundamental metrics like valuation and macroeconomic factors.

Great Ideas, Bad Timing

The stock market is setting new highs, but fundamental economic data remains subpar. For the past several years, we have expected “next year” to finally break out to a GDP growth rate of at least 3%, representing an escape velocity to grow our way out of the credit crisis doldrums.

The zero interest rate policy sustains the slow growth scenario, but there is only so much Fed monetary policy can do. The fundamental problems are fiscal in nature, and until Washington decides business and rich people are not the cause of the problem, we’ll continue to trudge along. Policies to stimulate business and job creation would be a nice start. Can you name one pro-business policy? Requiring businesses to offer health-care helps some people with medical issues, but does it stimulate job creation? Raising the minimum wage has noble intent, but if you are running a business, you’ll sharpen your pencil again before expanding.

No one can say how long the divergence between disappointing GDP growth and a rising stock market will last. Either the economy’s pent up demand overcomes Washington’s bureaucracy and grows faster, or we’re in for a correction. Let’s ignore the possibility of change in Washington for the meantime.

The key takeaway is, plan for liquidity, lean toward equity with the balance, and hope Washington will get out of the way. Lyndon Johnson pushed his Great Society programs at the same time as he funded the Vietnam War. We had a miserable decade in the stock market. Obama is pushing social reforms at the same time we try to recover from a credit crisis. Great ideas, bad timing.

Where the Wild Things Are in the Economy

One takeaway from 2008 – 2009 is that sometimes diversification does not work as planned. Most investment asset classes declined in the credit crisis.  Cash is the conspicuous exception.

As noted in last Friday’s post, reserving for liquidity is even more important than usual (given my perception) of the elevated prospects for a market convulsion, as we make our way back to the old normal.  There’s a lot to be said for cash as an alternative to bonds.  If interest rates or inflation spikes and bond prices plunge, and if cash is available to scoop up the bargains, losses on long positions can be mitigated.

Holding cash means accepting a negative rate of return on an inflation adjusted basis.  Long-term, this is a losing strategy.  As a tactical allocation, it means not being greedy.  And if you need liquidity, it’s just common sense.

Finally, if the US dollar falls in a currency crisis, the price of imports will rise.  Perhaps the best way to hedge against the currency risk of cash, is an expanded international allocation denominated in foreign currency.  But if the “correction” is global, then the US dollar will be as good as other currencies and might prove to be a safe haven.  If this seems like a circular argument, that shows how interconnected things have become.

Bubbles

During the past 20 years, we suffered 2 vicious corrections, 2000 and 2009. Attribution is simple. In 1999, tech stocks took off to the moon on the back of internet hype. Then, the combination of low interest rates, a love of real estate born of the prior equity bubble, mortgage securitization, and other factors led to soaring house prices. By 2007, houses were generally highly leveraged and overpriced. The collateral damage of the housing and mortgage crisis spread throughout the economy in ways few had imagined.

Which brings us to today. Allow me ask the obvious, what is overpriced today and which dominoes might prove vulnerable in a correction? Our artificially low interest rates and corresponding bond valuations seem the most likely candidates for disruptive movements.

The factors driving interest rates are complex, and countless financial instruments are tied to interest rates. This is not to predict economic Armageddon, but the dominos are set. There are paths to unwind QE without disruption, but we have not been down this path before. We can hope the path to normal will not be too disruptive. I am acutely aware of what I don’t know, but I have an idea where it might come from. This is fat tail risk.

When liquidity is important, it is important to reserve for it. If managing volatility is important, you might pay a steep price to hedge. Much like the crisis of 2000 and 2009, this one, if it occurs, will likely pass within a few years. I suggest reserving for liquidity needs anticipated within 3 to 5 years, and staying the course with the balance. Manage risk, don’t try to avoid it (you can’t).